Days after Climate Conflict Action (CCA) launched its report on violent incidents in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) for 2024, the Philippine National Police (PNP) in the region confirmed a grim reality: over 100 shooting incidents have already been recorded in the first two months of the year.
According to the Police Regional Office in BARMM (PNP-BAR), 87 cases were documented from January to February 2025, equating to an average of two to three shooting incidents per day. The situation paints a stark picture of lawlessness and highlights the persisting cycle of violence in the region. PNP-BAR Director PBGEN Romeo Macapaz acknowledged the difficulty of enforcing the election gun ban, attributing it to historical conflicts, the presence of armed groups, and politically motivated killings. In response, authorities have formed a Special Investigation Task Group to probe two recent high-profile cases in Maguindanao del Sur. However, given the frequency and scale of violence, will this be enough?
The Deteriorating State of Peace and Security
The surge in violence validates CCA’s warning that the upcoming election could be the most violent in recent history, even surpassing the previous Barangay elections. The optimism surrounding the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) under President Benigno Aquino III and OPAPP head Ging Deles was short-lived. While there was an initial period of calm—a so-called “honeymoon period”—violence has resurged, reaching alarming levels. The promise of peace is now overshadowed by the normalization of killings, making violence an unfortunate and daily reality for the Bangsamoro people.
Despite promises that development would bring stability, the assumption that economic progress ensures peace has not held true, at least not uniformly. While areas like Sulu under Governor Tan have seen relative stability, other parts of BARMM remain plagued by clan wars (rido), political assassinations, and armed conflicts. Social media is flooded with disturbing footage of shootings in broad daylight, further normalizing violence.
Since the launch of CCA’s 2024 report last Thursday, none of BARMM’s highest officials have reacted to or confirmed the findings. This silence is unusual, as BARMM leaders are known for their swift responses to pressing issues. Their lack of acknowledgment raises questions about the government’s stance on the worsening security situation and whether it intends to address the crisis at all.
The Crisis of Indigenous Peoples and the Proliferation of Arms
Another deeply concerning issue is the targeted killings of Non-Moro Indigenous Peoples. Reports of entire communities being burned and forcibly displaced remain underreported, and authorities have failed to implement robust measures to protect these vulnerable groups. Meanwhile, the proliferation of firearms in BARMM raises serious questions about governance and security.
Based on a 2020 population survey, there are an estimated 880,857 households in BARMM. If each household possesses two to three firearms, this amounts to approximately 1.7 million guns in circulation. This figure is staggering—more than enough to fuel a large-scale conflict that could engulf the entire island of Mindanao. Even the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has admitted that, in terms of numbers, security forces would be vastly outgunned should a civil war break out. The only advantage the AFP holds is its superior assets, such as air and armored support, which local groups lack.
Francis Lara, during the launch of CCA’s report, raised a crucial point: Why is there partiality in implementing the gun laws in the Philippines? In other regions, an ordinary citizen must undergo a rigorous process to obtain a firearm license, yet in BARMM, gun ownership remains unchecked. Where is the bottleneck? Who is responsible for this glaring lapse in regulation?
The MILF and the Cycle of Violence
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) originally broke away from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), arguing that their struggle was not political but Islamic. However, today, the MILF-led governance of BARMM is marred by internal conflicts, with factional disputes leading to thousands of displacements and countless deaths. This raises difficult questions: Was MILF the right group to negotiate with in the first place? Would BARMM have been better off under MNLF leadership? The oppressed have seemingly become the oppressors, and peace remains elusive.
The Government’s Role in Perpetuating the Crisis
The Philippine government must be held accountable for its indirect role in this crisis. It has been vocal in its opposition to the previous administration’s war on drugs due to human rights concerns, yet the rampant violence in BARMM—killings, displacement, and discrimination—continues unchecked. Is the government turning a blind eye in the name of preserving a so-called “fragile peace”?
Civil society organizations (CSOs) that once championed Bangsamoro’s peace process now find themselves embedded within the system, holding advisory positions in the Bangsamoro Parliament. Many of these individuals were human rights advocates during Martial Law, yet today, they remain silent. Have they sacrificed their principles to maintain political legitimacy?
Another Killing, Another Statistic
As this editorial is being written, another individual has been shot dead in Pagalungan, Maguindanao del Sur, bringing the body count to 88. Should this be considered “lucky” because of the double eight? Of course not. The police and military, despite their best efforts, remain outnumbered and outgunned. This crisis is beyond their control.
Urgent Steps Beyond Election Security
While the CCA has outlined five key recommendations for securing the upcoming election, the long-term solution to BARMM’s violence requires systemic change.
- An Independent Election Monitoring System – This must be in place before, during, and after the elections, as violence and displacement tend to escalate post-election. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) must take proactive measures, particularly in hotspots such as Cotabato City, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Mamasapano, Marawi City, and Malabang.
- Strict and Impartial Gun Law Enforcement – The military and law enforcement agencies must enforce the gun ban uniformly. Politicians, MILF members, and other armed groups should not be above the law. The government must ensure that all violations are met with immediate accountability.
- Preventing Clan Feuds Before They Escalate – The government must initiate political settlements and mediation efforts early. With 28 active clan feuds identified, timely intervention is critical. Strengthening community-based networks to monitor tensions and support local peace initiatives will be vital.
- Restoring Public Trust in the Electoral System – COMELEC must address widespread skepticism about its impartiality. Preventing last-minute reshuffling of election officers and enforcing its regulations strictly will be crucial in ensuring a fair and credible election.
- Tackling the Roots of Violent Extremism – The resurgence of extremism cannot be ignored. Declaring “VE-free areas” is not enough. The government must audit election expenditures to prevent illicit campaign financing and address the root causes of extremism, such as discrimination and unfulfilled reintegration promises.
Beyond Fragile Peace
The reality in BARMM proves that peace agreements alone do not guarantee lasting stability. Without genuine disarmament, an impartial legal system, and accountability from all stakeholders—including the MILF, the government, and civil society—Bangsamoro will continue to teeter on the edge of conflict. The question now is: Will the nation act before it’s too late, or will it allow Bangsamoro to slip further into chaos?