As the Bangsamoro heads towards its first parliamentary elections in 2025, the security and development challenges facing the region should give peacebuilders and policymakers serious pause. The promise of stability and self-governance that accompanied the formation of the BARMM is now being tested by a surge in violence, an electoral process fraught with uncertainty, and the unresolved legacies of conflict.
Climate Conflict Action (CCA), formerly known as International Alert, launched its 2024 report in time for the upcoming elections, reinforcing its reputation as the premier go-to organization for data, analysis, and perception studies in the Bangsamoro. Their latest findings raise urgent questions about whether the peace process is failing and what it means for the communities caught in the middle of escalating violence.
Despite expectations of a more peaceful Bangsamoro, the reality on the ground tells a different story. Instead of ushering in greater stability, the transition has been marked by continued violence, highlighting three key issues: 1) the dashed expectations of local communities for a durable peace; 2) an extended cycle of revenge killings and the intensification of horizontal wars; and 3) the resurgence of violent extremism, even in areas previously declared VE-free. These challenges raise urgent questions about the region’s capacity to prevent a deeper relapse into violence.
Since 2020, violence has been on a steady rise, showing no signs of a decline, especially as we enter a traditionally violent election year. The upward trajectory is expected to continue with no significant action taken to address illicit weapons and strengthen governance in response to both vertical and horizontal violence.
2024 marks the biggest increase in violent conflict since the 2017 Marawi siege. Last year, CCA provided clear data showing a rebound in conflict incidents, reversing the decline seen between 2017 and 2019. The spike in incidents tied to ISIS activity and the impact of the pandemic in 2020 has now been followed by a sustained climb in violence.
This trend raises serious concerns for 2025. With elections approaching, the risk of an even greater surge in violence is high.
CCA and the Early Response Network (ERN) have monitored 28 active clan feuds across the Bangsamoro resulting in deaths and displacement. In 2024, most violent clashes occurred in Maguindanao del Sur and the Special Geographic Areas. At the municipal level, the most critical hotspots are: Mamasapano, Datu Hoffer Ampatuan, Buluan, Shariff Saydona Mustapha, Rajah Buayan, and Sultan sa Barongis in Maguindanao del Sur; Kadayangan and Nabalawag in the Special Geographical Areas; Datu Odin Sinsuat in Maguindanao del Norte; Cotabato City; Malabang, Butig, and Marawi City in Lanao del Sur; and Lantawan, Maluso, and Hadji Mohammad Ajul in Basilan.
These escalating revenge killings and horizontal wars highlight a growing pattern of instability. A major concern now is how the postponement of elections will prolong and potentially worsen these conflicts, particularly in election hotspot areas such as Cotabato City, Datu Odin Sinsuat, and Marawi City.
Beyond the immediate violence, the persistence of these wars raises serious doubts about the promises of a durable peace. Instead of quelling fears of a relapse into violence, the current trajectory suggests that the foundations of peace remain fragile five years after the creation of the BARMM. Notably, one of the key actors fueling these conflicts is the MILF itself.
Even before the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), internal divisions within MILF factions had already led to violent confrontations. Over time, these divisions have given rise to new, more radical groups that embrace extremist rhetoric and terroristic practices.
Violent extremism is down but not out. While overall incidents have declined in the last few years, recent developments indicate a resurgence in the Lanao provinces, and reemergence in Basilan—which the government had previously declared free from the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and violent extremism.
In towns such as Piagapo in Lanao del Sur, and Munai and Poona Piagapo in Lanao del Norte, our Critical Events Monitoring System has recorded a rise in cases of recruitment, particularly among youth. Additionally, violent extremist and armed groups are reportedly being hired by local politicians, a dangerous trend that further entrenches violence in the region.
Meanwhile, in Basilan, the December 2024 ambush that left three intelligence agents dead underscores the lingering threat of extremist networks. A second case that drew the attention of security forces and peacebuilders was the ambush of a military unit escorting an international development agency, allegedly carried out by MILF forces. While the incident remains under investigation, a potential violent extremist angle is being examined.
Beyond VE-affiliated groups, the presence of communist insurgents continues to pose a challenge. CEMS recorded a recent clash between military forces and NPA combatants in Maguing. This highlights the ongoing activity of the NPA in critical hotspots within the Bangsamoro, further complicating the security landscape.
What This Means for the Peace Process and Communities
With this report from CCA, it raises the pressing question: Does this mean that BARMM and the Philippine government are on the wrong path, and does it signal the failure of the peace process? The continuing rise in violence, resurgence of extremism, and fragility of governance structures suggest that the peace process is faltering rather than progressing. If the institutions meant to enforce stability and democracy become the very catalysts for conflict, the legitimacy of the entire peace framework comes into question.
For the communities in Bangsamoro, this instability translates into ongoing displacement, insecurity, and deepening distrust in governance. The promise of self-rule and sustainable peace appears increasingly out of reach for those who continue to suffer from rido, electoral violence, and extremist threats. Without urgent and effective interventions, the cycle of conflict may entrench itself further, leading to a future where Bangsamoro remains locked in a state of perpetual instability rather than realizing its full potential for peace and development.
Given these issues, CCA put forward the following recommendations:
First, an independent, autonomous, and redundant election monitoring system must be in place before, during, and after the elections. Historically, violence and displacement often escalate in the post-election period. Monitoring is not just about ensuring the credibility of the electoral process—it is also crucial in securing public trust in the results of the polling. We challenge the COMELEC to take proactive measures to ensure that violent incidents do not erupt in previous hotspots such as Cotabato City, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Mamasapano, Marawi City, and Malabang.
Second, law enforcement and the military must enforce the gun ban with full impartiality. This applies not only to local politicians but also to the MILF and other armed groups. No group should have the power to obstruct security forces in implementing the law. The government must ensure that any violations—whether by political figures or armed factions—are met with immediate accountability, including arrests and disarming if necessary.
Finally, in addressing the resurgence of violent extremism, the government must remain vigilant and ensure that declarations of “VE-free areas” do not lead to complacency. A strict audit of election expenditures must be conducted to ensure that campaigns are not being financed through illicit activities. Furthermore, the root causes of extremism—such as discrimination, unfulfilled reintegration promises, and the lack of opportunities for young people—must be addressed.
With the elections just months away, these measures are not just necessary—they are urgent.